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Proactive Threat Detection for Connected Cars Using Recursive
Bayesian Estimation
Haider al-Khateeb, Gregory Epiphaniou, Member, IEEE, Adam Reviczky,
Petros Karadimas, Member, IEEE, and Hadi Heidari, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract— Upcoming disruptive technologies around autonomous driving of connected cars have not yet been matched with
appropriate security by design principles and lack approaches to incorporate proactive preventative measures in the wake of
increased cyber-threats against such systems. In this paper, we introduce proactive anomaly detection to a use-case of hijacked
connected cars to improve cyber-resilience. Firstly, we manifest the opportunity of behavioural profiling for connected cars from
recent literature covering related underpinning technologies. Then, we design and utilise a new dataset file for connected cars
influenced by the Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS–B) surveillance technology used in the aerospace industry
to facilitate data collection and sharing. Finally, we simulate the analysis of travel routes in real-time to predict anomalies using
predictive modelling. Simulations show the applicability of a Bayesian estimation technique, namely Kalman Filter. With the analysis
of future state predictions based on the previous behaviour, cyber-threats can be addressed with a vastly increased time-window for
a reaction when encountering anomalies. We discuss that detecting real-time deviations for malicious intent with predictive profiling
and behavioural algorithms can be superior in effectiveness than the retrospective comparison of known-good/known-bad behaviour.
When quicker action can be taken while connected cars encounter cyber-attacks, more effective engagement or interception of
command and control will be achieved.
Index Terms—Connected Cars, Cyber Physical Systems, Cyber Threat, Proactive Detection, Bayesian Estimation, Kalman Filter.
I. INTRODUCTION
SEVERAL technological trends have converged to allowand advance new semi and indeed fully autonomous
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) that are taking over and shape
the traffic of the public space from automotive transportation
through marine vessels, aerial vehicles of drones and aircraft
systems. New Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET) and Ve-
hicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANET) are utilised to exchange
traffic data and steer vehicles through new Intelligent Trans-
portation Systems (ITS). The rationale for this paper was moti-
vated by the challenge of increasing cyber-threats posed by and
to CPS [1], more precisely, the gap of resilience in addressing
the security design of such systems and the lack of real-time
cyber-threat detection of malicious intruders. Advancements
in modern machine learning and algorithms for profiling and
behavioural analysis to aid decision making are already widely
used, with the knowledge of Intrusion Detection and Preven-
tion Systems (IDPS) and anomaly detection through Big Data
Analytics at networks’ perimeter, known-good behaviour can
be deduced at large-scale movement flows of regulated traffic
[2]. However, current implementations are narrow-focused on
reactive signature-based models. Furthermore, malfunction of
sensors and rogue behaviour [3] has not been managed by
automated vehicles, which is essential for levels 4 and 5 of
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the driving automation classification scheme defined by the
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). These levels expect
no human intervention or driver’s attention for safety, hence
require automated fail-safe mechanisms. The different levels
of automation from manually driven, semi-autonomous to fully
autonomous connected vehicles are described and explained in
the book: “Preparing a Nation for Autonomous Vehicles” [4].
For this case study, the baseline will be set on level 5, fully
autonomous connected cars. However, weaknesses in semi-
autonomous (autopilot) cars have been reported as well, it is
projected that interconnecting these systems will lead to an
even bigger attack surface.
The utilisation of the internet, a global system that has no
central governance, to communicate elementary and aggre-
gated sensory data often in real-time via ubiquitous devices [5]
would introduce cyber-threats [6] [7] [8] to the architecture [9]
of autonomous vehicles, like the particular instance of cyber-
hijacking presented in our case study. Currently, the industry
is moving ahead to produce self-driving cars, buses and trains,
autonomous flying drones and various other transportation
systems, whilst the aspect of built-in security is falling short.
Moreover, the Internet of Things (IoT) creates a world where
devices and systems can be taken over and cause significant
disruptions in our day-to-day lives.
With over a billion cars owned in the world and being
potentially replaced with new connected vehicles, this paper
provides empirical results as a proof-of-concept on how re-
silience can be improved by means of performing behavioural
analysis of such systems with the help of profiling by looking
particularly at autonomous connected cars. Profiling will help
to address the correlation of various systems, whereas through
behavioural analysis it can be deducted whether an expected
state of a sensor reading is within the margin of error. A
proactive approach to detect and react to a specific use case
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of cyber-hijacking will be presented in order to demonstrate
that effective proactive security can be built-in to create
resilience towards cyber-attacks. In contrary to this approach,
current implementations utilise supervised machine learning
algorithms [10] but they are impractical for live analysis of
vehicles’ movements due to the training elements required to
develop the inductive bias for the algorithm [11].
We claim that Recursive Bayesian estimation is superior
to supervised machine learning for real-time predictive mod-
elling of future states for comparable travel routes and actual
motion patterns [12]. A behavioural profile helps to detect
any deviation from the norm for a journey conducted by a
Level 5 car using mathematical probability density functions,
anomaly detection can then be reacted upon far quicker than
before. This research is looking at the current related efforts
of methods in profiling and behavioural analysis [13] and
discusses their drawbacks or suitability for proactive threat
detection. If significant improvements to reaction times is
achieved, malicious intent can be thwarted to eliminate the
intended harm. A proactive stance can be taken instead of the
current re-active solutions to predict cyber security-threats as
early as they happen in the kill chain.
To prove that this approach of behavioural analysis can
be a baseline of cyber-defence of CPS [14], this paper will
demonstrate the technique on a specific scenario of connected
cars as an example, from which it can be deduced that the
approach has potential and is fit for purpose in the general
application of land-based or aerial transportation. Particular
anomalies representing events and threats have been consid-
ered in our case study in the nature of cyber-risk and the threat
landscape of the wider Internet of Things. An example of a
main risk that could arise from the cyberspace is a remote
hack into the CPS to change course of action for the travel
in a way to either divert or create damage by driving the
vehicle against traffic rules and laws that everyone abides. For
semi-automated cars, this could also include a dangerous lane
deviation due to the driver’s unconsciousness. Obviously, there
are many more threats such as those posed by state-sponsored
attacks, mass-hijacking of vehicles and nonetheless system and
pilot errors. We should acknowledge the challenge of unsafe or
untrustworthy transportation systems because any component
in the car (including sensors that are being relied upon) can
malfunction and give false readings. Proper redundancy, as
well as a fail-over mechanism, should be in place on both
hardware and software levels to filter out false events.
The remaining of this paper covers related work in Section
II and research method in Section III. Results are presented
and discussed in Section IV and finally conclusions and future
work are shared in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Work on Connected Cars is subclassified within the broader
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) umbrella term. CPS is an
emerging research area defined by inevitably widely accepted
attributes based on which they are described as being au-
tonomous, timeliness, distributed, fault-tolerant, scalable, re-
liable and secure. In [15], a prototype architecture has been
presented to demonstrate these attributes and identify chal-
lenges. CPS provides the opportunity to businesses to adopt
innovative practices, [16] conducted action research based
on innovation theory to investigate connected cars as a case
study. Their empirical results showed that Volvo cars were
more successful to pursue digital innovation through a set
of capabilities such as opening design spaces and embracing
complementary products. However, the complexity of CPS
which includes but not limited to the different modes of op-
eration and physical components introduced new challeneges
to conventional system modelling.
A. Data Storage, Communication and Modelling
Without capturing and storing validated quality data through
the various sensors of the connected car, the analysis would be
meaningless. Therefore, it is utmost important to define what
data needs to be captured, through what means (readings of
sensor data) and how the quality of reading is ensured, coupled
with minimal misreading and errors. Some of the inevitably
present abnormal readings left in the dataset can be filtered
out with mathematical models.
The aviation industry has the Automatic Dependent Surveil-
lance - Broadcast (ADS-B) as a globally supported tracking
system to define prerequisite data types. Data is periodically
sent for tracking purposes to air traffic control ground stations
and other aircrafts [17]. Among the defined fields in the
ADS-B scheme are flight ID, geolocation, time, speed and
various other sensor readings. Furthermore, the industry has
car data-sharing systems in place such as the CarSharing
Module (CSM) which has two integrated microcontrollars with
the ability to support Android Apps to provide additional
features including Human Computer Interaction (HCI). A
demonstration of their application in a real-world scenario can
be seen in [18] were CSM data were used to analyse the impact
of a parking price policy. Examples of captured data include
the identification (ID) of an individual renting a car, reading
of a battery charge indicator, location and speed.
A prototype platform by [19] presented a back-end for
applications to communicate with connected cars. The plat-
form provided an abstract layer to facilitate communications,
identity management, and provided access to data storage
components. Such proposals enable sensors, robots, smart
meters and other CPSs to establish communication sessions
with no, or very little, human intervention. This Machine-
to-Machine (M2M) paradigm is usually tested or simulated
based on small-scale M2M models [20], with recent attempts
addressing future needs by increasing scalability to trillions
of connected devices [20]. If we consider a case study of
connected cars, information such as speed can be exchanged
to optimise traffic control at an intersection. Even with the
assumption that partial data will be missing because not all
cars are connected, [21] showed that traffic signals can still
learn to adapt and accomodate road demands to build more
efficient traffic systems. In their experiment, [21] simulated
various demand ratios to investigate the impact of updating
the minimum green-time value on the penetration rate of cars.
Software agents can be autonomous and implement intel-
ligent decision-making which makes them suitable for mod-
(c) 2017 Crown Copyright. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
IEEE SENSORS JOURNAL, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XXXXXX XX, 2017 3
elling CPS. [22] developed a multi-agent model for a water
distribution network with semantic capabilities to analyse
data about the physical operations to the cyberspace. The
literature shows that deterministic models such as differential
equations and synchronous digital logic should be combined
for better realisation of CPS with evidence from projects
such as Ptides (Programming temporally-integrated distributed
embedded systems), which shows that deterministic models
can achieve faithful realisation in some distributed scenarios
[23].
B. Threat Detection and Prediction
Anomaly detection plays a crucial part in the proactive
approach to detect cyber-threats. An overview of various
detection techniques presented in [24] shows deviations from
the norm through mean functions hitting a threshold and hence
indicating a suspicious activity. Additionally, pattern matching
is a process were common structure is found to compare
and group against. Sequential and qualitative analysis utilises
ordering and performs analytical methods on the data, whereas
sampling focuses on bounding the collection of data. These are
some of the techniques implemented in Intrusion Detection
and Prevention Systems (IDPS) to analyse network traffic
[25]. An Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for connected
cars could share the same general internal processes of an
IDS as demonstrated in Figure 1. In contrast to conventional
signature-based solutions, modern trends in anomaly detection
are more adaptive to emerging theats associated with dynamic
systems such as CPS. Unlike Bayes Filters which stores the
previous state of a system to detects future behaviour [26],
supervised machine learning algorithms should be trained with
signatures of known attacks [27]. However, training time to
establish a baseline is disadvantageous when a rapid incident
response is required [13].
Fig. 1. Basic architecture of intrusion detection system (IDS).
Threat prediction techniques could utilise environmental
factors such as vulnerabilities and existing attack graphs [28]
or tackle the problem by means of quantifying the incorpo-
rated security principles such as privacy or anonymity [29].
Many predictive models are based on the Recursive Bayesian
estimation, also known as Bayes Filters [28]. Other proposals
utilise data-fusion frameworks, [30] demonstrate detection of
asymmetric and adaptive threats with the help of intelligent
agents where the prediction method is based on a decentralised
Makov (stochastic) game model. Furthermore, insider threat
prediction [31] is an interesting angle of how the behaviour of
malicious intent tries to blend with legitimate actions (Figure
2). In conclusion, cyber-threat detection and prediction in
connected cars should consider the applicability and suitability
of the proposed approach. It is also useful to consider hybrid
methods, [32] integrated different prediction methods into a
framework for security to apply a proactive approach with the
specific use case of remote cyber-hacking.
C. Behavioural Profiling
Profiling is the first stage of analysing and concatenating
similar groups of behaviour together. Behaviour of like-minded
people and drivers in similar roles can be argued to behave
in almost identical patterns. Machine learning have been
utilised to detect different types of online perpetrators based
on their social interactions in the cyberspace [33]. Likewise,
Bus drivers could have very similar reactions to speed, route
and alertness. Different types of individuals but also systems
behave differently, but deducing and predicting a collection of
a group with similar correlation can lead to a conclusion on
whether an expected behaviour is unusual. Creating profiles
to detect patterns usually assigned to intruders breaking into
the system [34] can help determine likelihoods of deviation
and raise suspicion on anomalies. Looking specifically at
these patterns for a system based profiling as compared
to human behaviour profiling of Cyber-Physical Systems is
adding value in combination with the estimation techniques
discussed in the previous section. Network traffic behaviour
has been researched and different profiling data groups have
been established [35], which will be taken advantage of to
create parallel profiling templates for connected cars. There
has been done some research on human behaviour profiling,
with different types of groups behaving in a similar pattern
(commuting people, families and various other types like taxi
drivers). In this paper the focus shifted towards whether a
profile pattern can be established with autonomous systems
in order to combine these groups with the machine learning
estimation techniques. It has been shown that indeed it is even
easier to group pre-defined system behaviour on predicted
routes as compared to humans driving freely on the motor-
way. Through profiling it is now also possible to distinguish
between autonomous and non-autonomous driven vehicles.
III. METHODOLOGY
To address the research question which can be expressed
as: How can cyber-resilience be improved proactively to
predict cyber-threats in rea-time on connected cars in such
a way as to counter cyber-attacks?, a quantitative data type
research methodology approach was selected underpinned by
(c) 2017 Crown Copyright. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
IEEE SENSORS JOURNAL, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XXXXXX XX, 2017 4
TABLE I
SAMPLE EXCERPT FROM THE PROPOSED DATASET FORMAT
Connected Date Time Position Position Position Orientation Orientation Ground Reporting
Car (ID) (UTC) (UTC) (latitude) (longitude) (elevation) (degree) (cardinal) Speed (m/s) (system)
2017:0db8:85a3 2017-03-11 06:50:27 47.82520828 12.54956887 456 190 S 9 ADS-B
2017:0db8:85a3 2017-03-11 06:50:29 48.24533500 12.53889999 455 191 S 11 ADS-B
2017:0db8:85a3 2017-03-11 15:30:40 48.24545299 12.53923599 449 12 N 7 ADS-B
Fig. 2. Insider Threat Prediction Model.
empirical data (sample location data) to facilitate experiments
on mathematical modelling (e.g. Bays filtering formulas) to
correlate routes of connected cars.
The research is based on a sample set of routes data
that has been created in order to show the behaviour of
different possible vehicle movement. The data uses real Global
Positioning System (GPS) coordinates but the routes should
only resemble motion patterns and are not taken from real
events (see: Table I). This set of data is then analysed for
behavioural profiling as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5.
A. Case Study of Connected Cars
This paper is addressing the problem statement and pro-
posed proactive threat detection approach by the means of
a case study with autonomous connected cars. The scenario
includes a route on the “Autobahn” in Germany. Sensors read-
ings were oriented to the ones seen in the semi-autonomous
vehicles found in the likes of Tesla Model X and BMW
13. Furthermore, the dataset for car movements on available
routes could be utilised to analyse the behaviour of individual
drivers or a pre-defined group of drivers (e.g. bus drivers
required to comply with specific company regulation while
driving) meanwhile this is not feasible with programmed
system movement.
B. Experiments
The proof of the research question is based on specific
experiments of hijacked connected cars. In our work, we
define ‘Hijacking’ as an attack from the cyberspace into the
connected vehicle and changing the pre-defined route to a
different destination, but could also be a more malicious intent
of deliberate harm of driving into the wrong direction or off-
street. Therefore, we assume that Eve can acquire knowledge
about the parameters read and communicated between Alice
(autopilot system) and Bob (command and control). Eve can
also alter this communication. The model also assumes that
Eve possesses the capacity to perform a Man-in-the-Middle
(MITM) attack with unbounded access to the channel. On a
holistic level a general experiment is proposed and formed as
the following sequence of events:
• Defining a specific route between two cities (from A
to B). This would be calculated and followed by a
navigation system
• Sampling of profile characteristics along the route based
on different behavioural factors
• Specification of the cyber-attack and route change being
carried out (hijacking)
• Detection of the deviation from the norm route with
Bayesian filtering (warning)
The following specific experiment has been conducted and
presented in this paper: sample route is from Munich, Germany
to Frankfurt, Germany on the motorways. The hijacking to
deviate the car to Stuttgart will be programmed to the system.
The deviation from a specific threshold value of comparable
routes with Bayesian filtering will trigger a warning.
C. Data Collection
Data collection consisted of two essential parts that need
to be defined before forward processing is possible. Firstly, a
collection of sensor readings that could create the schematics
of the open data. In that regard the following readings have
been defined:
• Speed metrics Mile/Hour (mi/h)
• Geolocation (longitude and latitude) via GPS positioning
• Elevation (altitude) via GPS positioning
• Orientation (cardinal direction) via gyroscopes
• UTC date-stamps via the Network Time Protocol (NTP)
• IPv6 addresses for unique identification of systems
The sample size is capped with an approximate target of 100
comparable routes of various vehicle movements. To illustrate
the dataset, Table I shows an excerpt of the different types
and fields of the data obtained. Each type of data is chosen
in line with International System of Units (SI) measurements
and universal or atomic definitions to abstract the proposed
method in order to be applicable to a wide range of use-cases.
Secondly, once the data types have been defined, a new
dataset template was created for this experiment as shown in
Table III which has been based on the established format used
for broadcasting aeroplanes in the aviation industry via ADB-S
as shown in Table II.
Having established the data sources and the data types
it should be noted that the local collection of cached data
is important to run on-the-fly data analysis on the big data
as well as for redundancy, error correction and not least
forensics (for legal reasons). This could be achieved with data
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TABLE II
AUTOMATIC DEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE: SAMPLE LOG
Time Position Orientation Groundspeed Altitude Reporting
Thu 01:18:41 34.87 27.54 SE 138 520 37000 ADB-B
Thu 01:19:11 34.81 27.59 SE 138 520 37000 ADB-B
Thu 01:19:41 34.76 27.65 SE 138 520 37000 ADB-B
Thu 01:20:11 34.70 27.71 SE 138 519 37000 ADB-B
Thu 01:20:41 34.65 27.77 SE 138 521 37000 ADB-B
Thu 01:21:50 34.52 27.90 SE 139 521 37000 ADB-B
Thu 01:22:49 34.47 27.96 SE 139 528 37000 ADB-B
Thu 01:28:10 33.82 28.63 SE 139 527 37000 ADB-B
Thu 01:28:46 33.77 28.68 SE 139 529 37000 ADB-B
Thu 01:29:21 33.69 28.77 SE 136 533 37000 ADB-B
Thu 01:32:01 33.39 29.00 SE 147 0 37000 ADB-B
Thu 01:33:01 33.27 29.09 SE 147 0 37000 ADB-B
TABLE III
SAMPLE LOG FOR THE CAR’S MOVEMENT IN OUR EXPERIMENT
ID Time Position Elevation Speed Reporting
2017:0db8:85a3:7334 Sun 2017-03-11 47.82 12.54 456 9 CSM
2017:0db8:85a3:7334 Sun 2017-03-11 48.24 12.53 455 11 CSM
2017:0db8:85a3:7334 Sun 2017-03-11 48.23 12.52 435 10 CSM
2017:0db8:85a3:7334 Sun 2017-03-11 48.13 12.58 509 9 CSM
2017:0db8:85a3:7334 Sun 2017-03-11 48.24 12.53 449 7 CSM
recorders, also commonly known as black boxes for connected
cars. Additionally, a central data collection service could
be established to extend this proposal to support Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS) and facilitate shared services for
a better adaptive traffic control systems.
While more metrics could be captured and incorporated
into the dataset, this minimalistic set of data was sufficient
to profile and perform the behavioural analysis.
D. Data Analysis and Modelling
Bayesian programming can be used to solve prob-
lems when important information is missing. It defines a
method to compute a joint distribution over a set of rel-
evant variables within experimental dataset δ with prelimi-
nary knowledge pi expressed as P (X1, X2, ..., Xn|δpi). This
method could then be used to compute probability distri-
bution P (Searched|Known) to decide a value for variable
Searched which addresses the requirement of this study
at a high-level. However, estimating the unknown density
function of a dynamic system such as connected cars requires
consideration to the time element while modelling stochastic
states. Therefore, we utilise an extended method namely
Recursive Bayesian estimation (a Bayes filter) [28], [36],
[37] to model incoming measurements related to the car’s
movement (e.g. Latitude, elevation, cardinal direction etc) in
real-time. Furthermore, we have applied specialisation of the
Bayes filter with Kalman Filter due to its efficiency. It has a
relatively low complexity, ability to provide the variance and
wide applications in similar problems [26].
Nonetheless, a wide range of free and open-source tools
and libraries are available to implement this statistical model
of probability and density functions. For example, Stan
(http://mc-stan.org/) can be used for statistical modelling,
data analysis, and prediction in the social, biological, and
physical sciences, engineering, and business. Full Bayesian
statistical interfaces for R and Python. Other tools include
PyMC for Bayesian statistical modelling and Probabilistic
Machine Learning (version 2 and 3) and PyBayes which is
a Python library for recursive Bayesian estimation (Bayesian
filtering).
One of the good resources to get an overview of the
tools and their utilisation for the experiments can be found
in the Probabilistic Programming and Bayesian Methods for
Hackers [38]. Further, by using the ShinyStan Software as a
Service (SaaS) solution to plot the beta functions for density
correlation it is possible to do a pairwise correlation.
Results of the statistical modelling could be interpreted with
metrics of deviations of optimal routes defined with Bayesian
filters calculated in percentage as key indicators. The balance
of how much deviation to allow until it is flagged as anomaly
is a considerable challenge.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In relation to the data being used for analysis, an excerpt to
demonstrate raw data collected from the sensors of a connected
car for the particular routes in the experiment can be seen in
Table III. It is important that security measures are planned to
maintain the integrity of this data to prevent attacks including
speed and location spoofing. Therefore, data collection should
be automatic and depends solely on the car’s navigation system
(no external input). Moreover, in agreement with current
initiatives to encrypt traffic of ADS-B systems [39], encrypting
this information while stored or broadcast can be used to
maintain privacy and protects against inappropriate or unau-
thorised use. Further to providing the required knowledge of
the previous state of the system to the algorithm, we anticipate
that Pay-As-You-Drive insurance schemes [40] will be one of
many futuristic products to raise service provider’s interest in
this information. However, authorised access via Application
Programming Interfaces (API) could be legitimately utilised to
share situation awareness of the street and therefore achieve
self-separation for the connected cars. Likewise, it could help
governmental traffic control systems to detect congestions.
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The main objective of this work was to research the appli-
cability of predictive modelling in connected cars to estimate
future states while travelling between two known locations to
deduce anomaly behaviour. The literature review in Section
II demonstrated a variety of mathematical models that could
be applied including slower and/or costly by design classi-
fication machine learning models. The applicability of these
is problematic because they could consume resources with
extended complexity when implemented in live systems [11].
For instance, compiling large and effective Neural Networks
require considerable processing power and other hardware
computing resources [41]. They also require a pre-generated
dataset of known-good/known-bad paths and car movements
where 2/3 of the dataset will be used to train the algorithm
with remaining 1/3 used for evaluation purposes; accuracy,
recall, F1-measure, precision and False-Positive-Rate (FPP)
are usually reported as a mean to measure the quality of the
tested classifier. This is time consuming. In contrary, Kalman
Filter accepts external uncertainty and can be satisfied with
knowing the previous state of the system only without storing
historic data or requiring training.
The main idea of this work is based on the probabilistic Re-
cursive Bayesian estimation. Estimating unknown future states
(through incoming metrics) via recursive density functions
allow the usage of three types of mathematical models:
• Filtering (estimate the current value)
• Smoothing (estimating past values)
• Prediction (estimating a probable future value)
These sequential Bayesian filtering methods, which are exten-
sively used in robotics and other embedded control devices
were found applicable on the data collected in our experiment
to perform prediction analysis. Looking at probabilistic models
using Bayesian methodology in programming for a unifying
framework [42]. Several filtering and smoothing algorithms
[43] can be incorporated and these could be tested in more
comprehensive field studies to optimise performance.
The very next aspect on correlating events is how well
the distribution of routes will create a profile based on the
behavioural analysis performed by the detection method. This
is shown in Figure 4. The plotting represents the behavioural
pattern (profile) of the change in speed and geo-location. The
line represents the RStan function calculating the baseline
of the said profile to which we are comparing against and
the deviation that will be measured against. The deviation is
not based on a single point, so one sudden acceleration at a
specific location will not necessarily give the alert, instead the
comparing can be optimised based on multiple events along
the route. Figure 5 provides a different representation for the
baseline.
Nonetheless, we could present the possibility that motion
behavioural profiles for connected cars are created for groups
of drivers or common systems (think about Heavy Goods
Vehicles (HGV) versus Taxis). Each of the correlation graphs
building a picture of the profiles a driving group has in
common. Although there is no need to actually pre-define
these profiles, as grouping them will be sufficient for applying
estimation techniques. Further research could be conducted
on the results shown here for the specific group behaviours.
Fig. 3. Anomaly Threshold.
Collectively looking at the patterns these correlation graphs
create, the deviation function becomes clearer. It has been
shown through the analytical work that this deviation can be
ring-fenced to a 5% margin with the estimation techniques
using Bayes filters. This process has been illustrated in Figure
3.
These preliminary results from our experiment indicates
that reducing the threshold of anomalies to a 5% margin for
deviations from the baseline could be feasible. However, more
field work will be required to conclude an ultimate value for
our method. The comparisons in the plots, as shown in the
examples of the Bayesian filters is as follows:
• Bayes filter plot with RStan: Figure 4 with a deviation
prediction of 90% outside the 5% threshold
• Bayesian sampling with PyMC3: Figure 6 with a corre-
lation of 87% inside the 5% threshold. This plot shows
the distribution or plotting of two different profiles for the
same route because the behaviour can differ in addition to
how this has been factored while considering the whole
route in terms of anomaly. Combining two profiles (or
more) gives a more representative baseline for the route
between A and B.
• Bayesian distribution and smoothing: Figure 5 is another
demonstration of the mean function to compare against
(baseline)
• Bayesian prediction with RStan: The chart in Figure
7 comparing three probabilistic functions to align the
threshold. This is also a plot of speed and geo-location
looking at a profile created between the two points of the
route. This has 2 aspects to it, firstly, it uses Bayesian
filtering algorithm with RStan which gives the baseline.
Secondly, the effect of increasing and decreasing the
tolerance has been demonstrated to count in the various
routes that can be taken between cities A and B, which
gives a minimum and maximum line of tolerance for the
profile and the deviation (of 5%) to be measured against.
The baseline for comparison is primarily the average func-
tion of genuine routes marked as known-good and the correla-
tion to this line with the added correction of errors. It has been
shown, that the behavioural prediction creates a function that
is better aligned to this baseline, as well as, that it reduces the
error correction to a smaller deviation threshold. Further, the
applications of the Bayes filter have also been compared with
each other. Depending on the scenario, the sequential Bayesian
filtering produced the best outcomes.
On the subject of false-positives, it has to be noted that the
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Fig. 4. RStan Bayesian Estimation: Distribution Graph.
Fig. 5. Bayesian Estimation: Baseline versus the speed (mi/h) and geo-
location profile.
development of reactive measurements and corrective actions
need to incorporate and handle exceptions and incidents on
legitimate routes in a way that the journey is not cut off
suddenly, but coming to a safe halt.
As cars get smarter with thousands if not millions of lines
of programming codes, attack vectors and vulnerabilities will
increase rapidly. It is therefore essential that all stakeholders
from engineers to retailers and senior level management in-
volved in the manufacturing supply chain will be working
around standards and consistent guidelines such as those
recently published in August 2017 by the Department for
Transport, Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure,
and Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles in the
UK. The report titled “The key principles of vehicle cyber-
security for connected and automated vehicles”, shares eight
principles one of which is highly relevant. Principle 8 states
that the system should be “designed to be resilient to attacks
and respond appropriately when its defences or sensors fail”.
Therefore, the utilisation of proactive detection methods (e.g.
our proposal) should be part of a defence-in-depth approach
(Principle 5 of the guidelines) which requires consoludating
the car with further Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems.
To discuss an example within our scope (detection), The
OpenCV (Open Source Computer Vision Library) can be used
for AI in terms of discovery, mapping and tracking as shown
in Figure 8. In sharp contrast, with the shown technique of
predicting future states in motion patterns through correlation
of historical data on the routes, instant analysis is possible
to determine steering instructions for the selected routes as
demonstrated with the route profile built in our experiment.
And the general idea for predictive modelling can be reused
on a variety of datasets and shown with different types of
transportation systems.
Fig. 6. PyMC3 Bayesian Distribution.
Fig. 7. RStan Bayesian Estimation: Filter.
Nonetheless, this emerging area of CPS resilience should
also highlight a much needed discussion on the responsibil-
ity and accountability of fully autonomous systems and the
implications their actions create raises questions such as:
• Will insurance cover the decisions taken by connected
vehicles?
• Who will be defined as the owner of the vehicle in a
society associated with a sharing economy?
The more pressing question is however how to program
(instruct) the vehicle on reacting to events. What are the moral,
ethical and philosophical duties [44] in case of unavoidable
collisions? Do collision control algorithms need to weight
on peoples life? Ultimately, observations on a change of
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Fig. 8. Open Source Computer Vision Library: (a) distance and lane detection
with radar and camera sensors, (b) perspective mapping and analysis, (c)
vehicle detection with object discovery, (d) real-time lane and vehicle tracking,
(e) edge and line detection for lane and vehicle mapping, (f) vehicle tracking
with lane detection through the camera sensor, (g) OpenCV mapping through
sensors (distance and obstacles).
behaviour will be inevitable with the increase of fully au-
tonomous vehicles as they have a pre-defined way of driving.
How will that affect the passenger who is not in charge of
the control of the vehicle anymore? Moreover, there is a need
for a method to determine the readiness of the society to start
accepting “auto-pilot error” incidents. Lastly, with legislations
in the likes of General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
the aspect of data privacy and personal data (PII) has to
be addressed. Incident reporting and protection of historical
sensitive data will play a big part in dealing with data flows
of future systems, not to mention the problems of identity and
authentication of Cyber-Physical Systems.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Connected cars should be resilient -by design- to cyber-
attacks. Appropriate responses when defences fail are triggered
by detection methods. With the specific scenario of cyber-
hijacking and change of routes, the threat modelling of remote
hacking was highlighted as a potentially dangerous intrusion
and it has been established that behaviour analysis and profil-
ing can be the solution to this deficiency.
This paper has presented an approach to proactive anomaly
detection for cyber-threat prevention by using concepts of
behavioural analysis through Bayesian estimation techniques
and a simulation has been carried out with the results as a
proof-of-concept to argue that this can significantly improve
resilience and reduce the time-cost required by supervised
machine learning to predict new malicious intents. Connected
cars have been chosen as a use case for the research to
focus on a sub-set of Cyber-Physical Systems and conduct
the behavioural analysis with a specific scenario of cyber-
hijacking. A quantitative research design has been utilised
by sampling a dataset of routes between two cities and the
motion patterns including sensor data on which statistical
methods and techniques are then applied. Through sampling,
it can be shown that the deviations from normal routes can
be recognised proactively which is an important improvement
compared to traditional reactive solutions. Each profile is
uniquely created for a specific car, although, some profiles can
arguably be generalised for specific case studies such as the
movement of buses following specific guidelines influenced
by a company’s policy. However, detection, in this case, could
cover non-compliance with policies rather than hijacking.
Future work in this area includes the development of an
integrated system with optimised methods based on a field
study incorporating multiple cars and drivers. This will help
to consolidate the system with corrective actions to identify
exceptions related to external factors. Once identified, this
external uncertainty can be used to enhance performance
through better Bayesian prediction.
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